Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the multi-user setting both in public and in secret-key cryptanalytic applications. In this setting, the adversary tries to recover keys of many users in parallel more efficiently than with classical attacks, i.e., the number of recovered keys multiplied by the time complexity to find a single key, by amortizing the cost among several users. One possible scenario is to recover a single key in a large set of users more efficiently than to recover a key in the classical model. Another possibility is, after some shared precomputation, to be able to learn individual keys very efficiently. This latter model is close to traditional time/memory tradeoff attacks with precomputation. With these goals in mind, we introduce two new algorithmic ideas to improve collision-based attacks in the multi-user setting. Both ideas are derived from the parallelizable collision search as proposed by van Oorschot and Wiener. This collision search uses precomputed chains obtained by iterating some basic function. In our cryptanalytic application, each pair of merging chains can be used to correlate the key of two distinct users. The first idea is to construct a graph, whose vertices are keys and whose edges are these correlations. When the graph becomes connected, we simultaneously recover all the keys. Thanks to random graph analysis techniques, we can show that the number of edges that are needed to make this event occurs is small enough to obtain some improved attacks. The second idea modifies the basic technique of van Oorschot and Wiener: instead of waiting for two chains to merge, we now require that they become parallel. We first show that, using the first idea alone, we can recover the discrete logarithms of L users in a group of size N in time O( √ N L). We put these two ideas together and we show that in the multi-user Even-Mansour scheme, all the keys of L = N 1/3 users can be found with N 1/3+ queries for each user (where N is the domain size). Finally, we consider the PRINCE block cipher (with 128-bit keys and 64-bit blocks) and find the keys of 2 users among a set of 2 32 users in time 2 65 . We also describe a new generic attack in the classical model for PRINCE.
Introduction
The multi-user setting is a very interesting practical scenario, which is sometimes overlooked in cryptography. Indeed, cryptosystems are designed to be used by many users, and usually cryptographers prove the security of their schemes in a single-user model except in some cases such as key exchange, public-key encryption and signatures. At EUROCRYPT 2012, Menezes [22] gave an invited talk pointing out the discrepancy between security proofs for message authentication code in the single-user and in the multi-user setting. As it was already been pointed out in [11] , he showed that there is a straightforward reduction between the security proof for one user and the security proof for L users with a success probability divided by L. Next, he recalled the key collision attack due to Biham [3] that matches this bound and that can be applied on various deterministic MACs (CMAC, SIV, OCB, EME, . . . ). In this attack, the adversary asks the MAC tag of a single message M for L different users; we call this the set of secret MACs. Then, for a subset W of size N/L of known keys (N is the key size), he computes M AC(k, M ) for all k ∈ W and builds the set of public MACs. If a collision occurs between the public and secret sets, then we learn one of the L secret keys. 4 For MAC schemes with an 80-bit security level, it is possible with time/memory tradeoff to make this reasonably practical and derive a key recovery of a single key among a set of L = 2 20 users, using time and memory 2 40 . Menezes thus insists that cryptographers have to consider this practical setting when devising or analyzing cryptosystems. For more results on multi-user attacks, the reader can also refer to [4] .
In this paper, we are interested in collision-based attacks [26] in the multi-user setting. We rely on the distinguished point technique to propose new attacks on the generic discrete logarithm problem, on the Even-Mansour cipher and on PRINCE. Collision-based methods have been nicely improved by van Oorschot and Wiener to become parallelizable using the distinguished point technique of Rivest and Quisquater and Delescaille [24] . Here, we extend these methods and apply them to cryptanalysis in the multi-user setting.
Our Contributions. From a cryptanalytic point of view, there are many ways to perform attacks in the multi-user setting. In this paper, we are interested by several scenarios. The first option is to recover all the users' keys (or a large fraction thereof) in time less than the product of the number of users by the time complexity to recover one key. Another direction is to improve Biham's attack and recover a single key in the multi-user setting with a reduced memory cost. Finally, we consider time/memory attacks starting with a precomputation whose result can then be used later to recover individual keys much faster.
Giant connected component. The multi-user setting for the discrete logarithm problem has been studied by Kuhn and Struik in [19] . They show that it is possible to adapt the parallel version of the Pollard rho technique with distinguished points to recover L keys in time √ N L where N is the size of the group as long as L 4 √ N . In the parallel version of Pollard rho method described by van Oorschot and Wiener, (see App. C) we run random walks in parallel, stop them once a distinguished point is reached and store this value for many starting points. We get a public set of distinguished points for the walks that begin at y a = g a for which we know a and a secret set from a user public key y for starting points yg b where b is known. Kuhn and Struik generalize this method by using many secret sets, one for each user. Once a distinguished point appears twice in the public and secret sets, the discrete logarithm of one user can be discovered, and consequently, we also know the discrete logarithm of all the distinguished points that were discovered during the random walks for this user. Therefore, as the number of "known" points increases, the probability of a collision between a secret point and a known one becomes higher. Similar results can be found in [21, 1, 2] .
Here, we show another method that works without any restriction on L and keeps the symmetry between all read points. Indeed, we do not have to wait until the first collision between a public point and a secret one happens, but we also consider collisions between secret points. More precisely, as soon as a collision between the public walks and the secret walks happens, we learn many discrete logarithms, since when two secret chains collide, we learn the difference between the discrete logarithm. We can then construct a graph whose vertices are the users and we add an edge if we know the difference of the discrete logarithm between these users. At some point, when the number of edges becomes slightly larger than the users, a giant component emerges in our random graph and if the public user is in this component (with high probability in time 2L ln L), then the discrete logarithm of all users will be known.
Our method has an advantage towards the method proposed by Kuhn and Struik as we use parallelism extensively. However, a disadvantage is that in our case we do not learn any discrete logarithms until the very end, when a giant component appears in the graph. In contrast, Kuhn and Struik's algorithm is sequential and so they find each discrete logarithm one after the other. Overall, the main goal of section 2 is to provide an educational example of the graph connexity approach and show that it is much simpler to analyze.
Lambda Method for two different Even-Mansour style functions. We were also able to apply similar techniques on Even-Mansour with domain size N . Indeed, using some functions related to the encryption scheme, we show that we can learn the Xor between the keys of two users. The previous technique can also be used to recover the keys of all users. However, in this case, we get a new problem: the two functions we iterate are no longer the same. Consequently, contrary to the DL case, once a collision appears, the chains will no longer merge and we cannot use distinguished point technique. To solve this issue, we tweak the two functions and define related functions that will no longer merge but become parallel. We show that this parallel method is as efficient as the previous one. For instance, we show an attack that partially solves an open problem of Dunkelman et al. that asked to find a memoryless attack on Even-Mansour with D queries to the secret function and T = N/D to the public function with D √ N . We propose an attack that matches these bounds (D = N 2/5 , T = N 3/5 ) but where the memory is N 1/5 as an application of our lambda-method. Furthermore, we also describe a multi-user attack which allows to learn all the keys in a set of N 1/3 users in data complexity N 1/3+ to each user and T = N 1/3+ time complexity by combining the two algorithmic tools. This attack exhibits new tradeoff where the amortized data complexity per user times the time complexity is reduced to N 2/3+ instead of N .
Application to PRINCE. PRINCE cipher [8] is a new block cipher recently introduced at ASI-ACRYPT 2012 with blocklength 64 bits and keylength 128 bits. Its design has a α-reflection property which is a related-key relation that transforms the decryption algorithm to the encryption process with a related-key. Here, we propose generic attacks on the full number of rounds. At FSE 2014 [9] , an attack on 10 rounds of PRINCE has been presented, with time complexity 2 60.7 and data complexity 2 57.94 . In [16] , an attack with slightly less than 2 128 allows to break all the rounds, but our attacks have a particular low time complexity. They are similar to the one on Even-Mansour but we have to take into account that in PRINCE, the internal permutation uses a secret key. They make use both of the α-reflection property and of the specific key scheduling of PRINCE, i.e. the relationship between the two whitening keys. The first attack allows to recover the keys of two users among a set of 2 32 users in time 2
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and the second one allows to recover the keys of all users in time 2 32 after a precomputation of time 2 96 and 2 64 in memory. Finally, we do not contradict the security bound showed in the original paper, but we show that different tradeoffs are possible.
Organization of the paper. In section 2, we present our results on the discrete logarithm problem in the multi-user setting and we use the properties of random graph in this setting.
Then, we present various results concerning the security of Even-Mansour: new time/memory/data (denoted T/M/D) tradeoffs, new time/memory (denoted T/M) attack solving the open problem of Dunkelman et al. and in the multi-user setting. In this part, we show how we can adapt the lambda-method when searching for collisions for two different functions based on the EvenMansour idea. Finally, in the last section, we present various generic attacks on the PRINCE block cipher, one in the multi-user setting and the other in the classical model.
Discrete Logarithms in the Multi-User Setting
In this section, we present a new algorithmic idea for performing T/M attacks with distinguished points in the multi-users setting. Our technique allows to compute the discrete logarithms of L public keys
for any value of L where N = | g |. Starting from the parallel version of Pollard rho method [26] , we compute cL/2 chains consisting of pseudo-random walks from y i (c/2 chains for each user by randomizing the starting point) until we discover a distinguished point d i ∈ S 0 where S 0 denotes the set of distinguished points 6 . Then, all distinguished points found are sorted and each collision between the distinguished points of different users d i and d j reveals a linear relation between x i and x j . We also compute a few chains starting from random points for which the discrete logarithm is known g x0 . Finally, we construct the random graph where the vertices are the public keys and we add an edge between y i and y j if we have a collision between d i and d j (this process can be described more formally using a random graph processas it is recalled in Appendix A). This edge is labelled with the linear relation between x i and x j . Once we have computed a sufficient number of collisions, a small constant time the number of users, then a giant component will appear with high probability. More precisely, in a graph with L vertices and cL/2 randomly placed edges with c > 1, there is a giant component whose size is almost exactly (1 − t(c))L, (see [7] recalled in Appendix A) where:
For c = 4, we get 1 − t(c) = 0.98. The discrete logarithm of all the points in the component of the x 0 's are known. If we want to recover the discrete logarithm of all users with overwhelming probability, we need 2L ln L edges to connect all connected components according to the coupon collectors problem and not cL/2, as it is recalled in Theorem 2(see Appendix A). Let the average length of the chains and S 0 the set of distinguished points. The average length of each chain is = N/|S 0 |. Assume we have computed i chains that do not collide, the probability that the (i + 1) th chain collides with one of the previous is i × /N (according to Theorem 3 in Appendix A for the expected number of collisions between two pseudo-random walks). Consequently, the expected number of collisions Coll is:
We want the number of collisions to be larger than cL/2, which implies L 2 N/2|S 0 | 2 ≥ cL/2, thus |S 0 | ≤ LN/c. Consequently, the overall cost is dominated by the computation of the chains, i.e. L × N/|S 0 | which is about √ cLN if |S 0 | = LN/c. Finally, in order to have cL/2 edges in our graph, each user has to compute a small number of chains using a small number of random input points of the form g xi+ri for known value of r i . The overall complexity of our attack is O( √ N L) for any value of L while Kuhn and Struik analysis achieves the value
Another possible approach to analyze known, unknown points and collisions between them would be to use a matrix. For this, we consider a symmetric matrix M where M [i, j] represents the linear relation between the discrete logarithms of i and j. Then we apply a random variable in order to sparsify the matrix. More precisely, we multiply the coefficient (i, j) of the matrix by 1 with probability p and by 0 with probability (1 − p), where these probabilities are independent. When we multiply by 1, that means, that we know the differences between the discrete logarithms of i and j.The question then becomes how many rows (with 2 non-zero coefficients) do we need to achieve full column-rank, which naturally leads to the same results: O(L * log(L)). However, when considering rows with O(log(L)) non-zero coefficients, we only needs O(L) rows. This would imply that for multi-user discrete logarithms the overall complexity can be reduced by a factor log(L) to O(sqrt(L * N )) by spending a factor log(L) more work in generating starting points of random combinations of log(L) known/unknown points (e.g., see [12] ). We choose to analyze the complexity in the same form as Wiener and van Oorschot which is usually the case for crypto papers, i.e we do not care on the log N factors that arise in such birthday algorithms. Indeed, the Kuhn and Struik algorithm hides also a log(N ) factor in order to get collisions with very high probability because a 1/2 probability is not sufficient since we need many collisions of this type.
Even-Mansour in the Single and Multi-User Settings

Brief description of Even-Mansour
At Asiacrypt 1991, Even and Mansour in [15] describe a very efficient design (called EM in the following) to construct a block cipher, i.e. a keyed permutation family Π K1,K2 from a large permutation π. The key K 1 is first xored with the plaintext, then the fixed permutation is applied and finally the key K 2 is xored to obtain the final value.
Their main result is a security proof that any attack that uses D on-line plaintext/ciphertext pairs (queries to Π) and T off-line computations (queries to π) must satisfy DT = N, where N = 2 n with n the size of the plaintext and key and which will be called the EM curve. The important part of the proof is that it is a lower bound for all attacks including known-plaintext attacks. It appears that the use of two keys K 1 and K 2 does not add much more resistance to the scheme. This variant of using K = K 1 = K 2 has been proposed under the name Single-Key Even-Mansour and we denote it by Π K . The security of this minimal version has been proved secure with the same bound as for the two-key version by Dunkelman et al. This minimal version is amazingly resistant and guarantees the same security bound, but it is not unexpected since usually the attacks look for the two keys independently and once the key K 1 is recovered, there is no security for K 2 . In the following, we see that the two-key version does not improve the security since most of the attacks on the single-key can be levered to this version.
In this section, we describe new results concerning the security of the Even-Mansour scheme which has recently been the subject of many papers [14, 20] . We recall the basic attacks and then, we present a basic T/M tradeoff for known plaintext attacks with better on-line complexity (Sect. 3.3) and a better T/M tradeoff for adaptive queries (Sect. 3.4). For this attack, we introduce our second algorithmic trick to discover collisions for two different functions based on the Even-Mansour construction. The main difficulty we have to solve is that when a lambda-like method is used to recover collisions, if two different functions are used, after the collision, the chain will no longer merge. To this end, we adapt the lambda-method to have parallel chains when the collision happens. Finally, we show that in the multi-user setting (Sect. 3.5) the precomputation cost can be amortized. It is possible to balance all the complexities to recover all the keys of N 1/3 users with N 1/3+ adaptive queries to each user, a precomputation time of N 1/3+ and the attack requires N 1/3+ in memory and N 1/3+ for the on-line time.
Previous attacks on Even-Mansour
In [13] , Daemen showed that the EM curve T D = N , is valid for a known plaintext attack at the point (T = N/2, D = 2). He also gave a chosen-plaintext attack that matches the EM curve for any value of D and T and in particular at the point
Later, Biryukov and Wagner described a sliding attack that matches the EM curve for known-plaintext but only at the point (T = N 1/2 , D = N 1/2 )(See Appendix B for more details about previous attacks). Recently, Dunkelman et al. introduce a new twist on the sliding attack whose complexities match the whole curve for any value of D and T using a known-plaintext attack which is exactly the result proved by Even and Mansour. Finally, Dunkelman et al. also provide a slidex attack on the two-key Even-Mansour scheme.
Simpler collision-based attack on the Single-Key Even-Mansour. In the single-key case a simpler attack achieves the same performance. The basic idea is to apply the Davies-Meyer construction to Π and to π. More precisely, write:
For any value of x, the equality F Π (x) = F π (x⊕K) is satisfied. Moreover, any collision between these two functions F Π (x) = F π (y) indicates that x⊕y is a likely candidate for the key K.
With this idea in mind, the problem of attacking the single key Even-Mansour scheme is reduced to the problem of finding a collision (or rather a few collisions) between F Π and F π . The simplest approach is simply to compute F π on T distinct random values and F Π on D distinct random values. When DT ≈ N , one expects to find the required collisions.
Moreover, this can be done in a more efficient way by using classical collision search algorithms with reduced memory. Indeed, it is possible to use Floyd's cycle finding algorithm to obtain such a solution for the special case D = T = N 1/2 , without using memory. However, in this case the attack is no longer a known-plaintext attack and becomes an adaptively chosen plaintext attack.
Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir ask whether it is possible to generalize this and to find memoryless attacks using D queries to Π and N/D to π where D N 1/2 ? In this paper, we partially answer this question, proposing attacks that use less than D N 1/2 data and memory lower than min(T, D) if we require the unkeyed queries to be precomputed. Without this requiring, we achieve a memoryless attack.
Extending the simple attack
Dealing with two keys Even-Mansour. A first important remark is that the simple attack on Single-Key EM can be extended to the two-key case. The idea is simply to replace the function π(x)⊕x by another function with similar properties. A first requirement is that the chosen function needs to be expressed by two different formulas, one based on π and the other on Π. The other requirement is that a collision on two evaluations, one of each type, should yield good candidates for the keys.
We now construct the required function and show that the simple attack on the single-key variant can be extended to two keys. We first choose a random non-zero constant δ and let:
We remark that F Π (x) = F π (x⊕K 1 ) and that F Π (x⊕δ) = F π (x⊕K 1 ) are both satisfied. As a consequence, every collision now suggests two distinct input keys K 1 = x⊕y and K 1 = x⊕y⊕δ. Except for this detail, the attack remains unchanged. Note that once K 1 has been found, recovering K 2 is a trivial matter.
Reducing the on-line time complexity. In this section, we focus on known-plaintext attacks and we first show that the EM security model does not separate the on-line and off-line time complexities, as usually done in T/M/D tradeoff. It is then possible to use T/M/D tradeoff for this blockcipher design as suggested in [5] by Biryukov and Shamir.
Let us separate the on-line time denoted by T on and the off-line time denoted by T off . Clearly, the total time complexity T is T on + T off .
The main idea of this section is to use a different approach to find a collision between F Π and F π . More precisely, given a value of F Π , we try to invert F π on this value. If we succeed, we clearly obtain the desired collision. In order to inverse F π , we rely on Hellman's algorithm(recalled in Appendix D). The T/M/D tradeoff is
In order to fully use Hellman tradeoff with multiple tables, we can use the δ in the definition of the function F π (x) = π(x) ⊕ π(x ⊕ δ) to define different and independent functions for each table. These attacks achieve
Using less data than memory. Despite its optimal efficiency in term of known-plaintext attack matching the EM curve, the Slidex attack presents an important drawback. Indeed, the public permutation π needs to be evaluated at points which depend on the result of the queries to the keyed Even-Mansour construction Π. As a consequence, with this attack, it is not possible to precompute the queries to π in order to improve the online time required to obtain the key to Π. Our previous attack based on Hellman's tables no longer requires adaptive queries, however, it is less costly than the Slidex attack in term of on-line time complexity but more costly than the simple collision-based attack (which uses adaptive chosen plaintext). The goal of the next subsection is to present an attack on Π, which is based on classical collision search algorithms and works by using queries to π and Π without any cross-dependencies. However, the queries to Π are adaptive but this new attack is more flexible to perform T/M tradeoff.
Time/Memory/Data tradeoff attack on Even-Mansour
Attacking Even-Mansour using distinguished points methods. In order to attack Even-Mansour using a distinguished point methodas recalled in Appendix C, we would like to construct a set of chains using the public permutation π and then find a collision with a chain obtained from the keyed permutation Π. One difficulty is that chains computing from π and from Π can never merge since they are based on different functions contrary to discrete logarithm section. We introduce here a new idea to solve this dilemma when the functions are based on the Even-Mansour construction. Let us define:
We remark that F Π (x⊕K 1 ) = F π (x)⊕K 1 . As a consequence, two chains based on F Π and F π cannot merge, but they may become parallel. Indeed, using the equation F Π (x⊕K 1 ) = F π (x)⊕K 1 and let two points X and x such that X = x⊕K 1 , where X (resp. x) belongs to an F Π chain (resp. x belongs to an F π chain), the next element Y = F Π (X) in the F Π chain and the next element y = F π (x) in the F π chain will satisfy:
So Y = y⊕K 1 , which means that Y and y satisfy the same relation as X and x, and so on. Therefore, as soon as by chance X = x⊕K 1 where X is an element of an F Π chain and x is an element of an F π chain, the same relation remains with the subsequent points of the two chains, i.e. we get two parallel chains.
Moreover, the detection of this good event is compatible with the distinguished point method. Indeed, it suffices to define a distinguished point x as a point with a value of π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ) in S 0 . Similarly, for chains constructed by using F Π , we define a distinguished point X as a point with a value of Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) in S 0 . Now if X = x⊕K 1 and x is a distinguished point in a π chain, then since
the point X is also a distinguished point in the Π chain, and therefore X⊕x gives a candidate for K 1 . Since the values π(x)⊕π(x⊕δ) and Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) are needed to compute the next element in the chains, using this definition does not add any extra cost for distinguished point detection. The important point, is that for a parallel chain based on F Π , a point X = x⊕K 1 corresponds to a distinguished point x if and only if Π(X)⊕Π(X⊕δ) is in S 0 .
An important difference compared to the classical search for collisions is that we do not need to backtrack to the beginning of the chains and identify where the chains merge. Indeed, seeing parallel distinguished points suffices to get candidates values for K 1 .
Analysis of the attack with precomputation. Since there is a clear symmetry between the keyed and unkeyed queries, we may assume that the number of unkeyed queries T is larger than the number of keyed queries D. Let B T the number of unkeyed chains to increase the probability of a collision between keyed and unkeyed chains. Moreover, this is the most reasonable scenario, since keyed queries are usually the most constrained resource. In this case, we need to choose the expected length of the chains we are going to construct and B T that satisfy the following relations:
Thus, = N/T and B T = T 2 /N . The required memory to store those chains is of size O(B T ). After terminating the computation of the unkeyed chains, we can turn to the keyed side. On this side, we want to perform about D = N/T evaluations of the function. Since D = , this means that we compute a single keyed chain and expect it to (parallel) collide with an unkeyed chain.
We Relaxing the precomputation requirement. Another alternative 7 is to perform the same attack while computing the keyed queries before the unkeyed ones. In this case, since there is a single keyed chain to be stored, we can achieve the attack using a constant amount of memory. Moreover, this variation works for any D = N α ≤ N 1/2 using T = N/D.
Attacks in the multi-user setting
In the multi-user setting, we assume that L different users are all using the Even-Mansour scheme based on the same public permutation π, with each user having its own key 8 , chosen uniformly at random and independently from the keys of the other users.
Of course, the attack from Section 3.4 can be easily applied in this context. Depending on the exact goal of the cryptanalysis, we have two main options:
1. If the goal is to recover the key of all users, the previous attack can be applied by repeating the D key-dependent queries for each user, while amortizing the T unkeyed queries across users. A typical case is to consider L = N 1/3 users, to perform T = N 2/3+ unkeyed queries (N 1/3+ chains of N 1/3 queries, memory N 1/3 ). For each new user, we need N 1/3+ keydependent queries. As a consequence, the amortized cost per user (up to constant factors c 0 = 20) is N 1/3+ queries of each type and the required memory also is N 1/3 . 2. If the goal of the cryptanalyst is to obtain at least one user key among all the users, it suffices to split the D key-dependent queries arbitrarily across the users.
However, we present in this section a much more efficient tradeoff in the multi-user setting. This tradeoff becomes possible without precomputation in N 2/3 , but by distributing the unkeyed queries among the users and by reusing the graph algorithmic idea of the section 2. For this, we construct a graph whose vertices are labelled by the users. Whenever we obtain a collision F Π (i) (x) = F Π (j) (y) for users i and j, we add an edge between the corresponding vertices labelled with x ⊕ y which is expected equal to
. Note that this indicates that we know the exclusive-or of the first keys of the two users.
If we have L vertices and cL/2 randomly edges with c = 4, there is a giant component whose size is 98% of the points, and with cL ln L, all the points are in this component with overwhelming probability(see Theorems 1 and 2 in Appendix A). Consequently, we obtain the exclusive-or of the first keys for an arbitrary pair of users. To conclude the attack, it suffices to find a single collision between any of the users functions F Π of the large connected component and the unkeyed function F π to reveal all the keys of these users.
Algorithm Description.
1. Create a constant number c/2 of chains for each user up to a distinguished point. 2. Sort the distinguished points. 3. Bring together the distinguished points into subsets, where we test whether the key candidate is really the good one. It is indeed easy to check with a few more queries if the xor of two keys is correct. 4. Construct the giant component and expect that the public user (the user with the unkeyed function), lies in this giant component. To this end, we initially begin with the set of reachable users containing only the public user. Then, we add to this set all the users that are in a group where a reachable user is present. At some point, the reachable set is stable and we stop.
5. From the public user, we cross over the giant component and determine the keys of each user.
The first step requires cL /2 data and time O(c ) on average per user where is the average length of the chains. Then, the remaining steps are performed in time linear in the number of users L. Typical parameters are: for an arbitrary small positive constant c, we expect with N 1/3 users, c · N 1/3 queries per user and N 1/3 unkeyed queries, to recover almost all the N 1/3 keys with overwhelming probability. If we want to recover all users, we need to have L ln L = cN 1/3 ln N = N 1/3+ edges (instead of cL/2) to connect all components according to the coupon collector's problemrecalled in Theorem 2 in Appendix.
Analysis of the attack. We want to use results from graph theory to prove the correctness of our algorithm, this means that we have to prove that the assumptions of the giant component theorem are satisfied. We have to show that we construct of a random graph according to the Erdös-Rényi model of random graphs, in which each possible edge connecting pairs of a given set of L vertices is present, independently of the other edges, with probability p. In this case, we know that with this model of random graph, if the number of edges c.L/2 is larger than the number of vertices L, there is with high probability a single giant component, with all other components having size O(log L) according to [7] (also recalled in Theorem 1 in Appendix).
Consequently, we need to prove that we construct a random graph and that the edges are added independently of each others. We will define an idealized version of the attack and we will show that the attack works in this version. Then, we will prove that the idealized version and the attack are equivalent using simulation argument.
In the idealized model, the simulator randomly chooses L keys K 1 , . . . , K L uniformly at random. Then it iterates the functions F (i)
, where S 0 is the set of pairs containing a distinguished point d i and an identificator of this point id(d i ). The identificators are unique, which means that we do not have collision on them. Finally, the simulator reveals the identificator of the point x ⊕ K i and the point x . The value K i cannot be recovered from the information that the simulator returns.
To show that the attack works in this ideal model, we just have to see that if two users have the same identificator, then x ⊕ K i = x ⊕ K j and therefore x ⊕ x = K i ⊕ K j which is the same information as in the real attack. Now, we will prove that the simulator does not need to know F
(i)
Π and can simulate the information by only using the public random function F π and that the distribution of its outputs is indistinguishable from the idealized model. The simulator generates at random L random keys for the EM scheme. For each key, we will show that the pairs distinguished point/identificator can be generated only using F π . Indeed, x the th iteration of F (i) Π with key K i from the value x 0 is the value K i ⊕ x and this value is also the result of the iteration of the public function F π from the value x 0 ⊕ K i . Consequently, to generate the pairs (distinguished point, identificator), the simulator can compute (x ⊕ K i , id(x )) without interacting with the users. As in this last case, the pairs are generated at random without interacting and knowing the function and since the function F π are random, the edges in the graph are added at random and independently of each others and so that the graph is a random graph according to the Erdös-Rényi graph model.
Experimental results. We implement the previous attacks on an Even-Mansour cryptosystem using the DES with a fixed key and n = 64. We simulate 2 22 users and for each user we create 8 chains (80 for the public user). We use distinguished points containing 21 zeroes and so the expected length is 2 21 on average. We bound the length of the chains to 2 24 , this means that if we remove the chain if we have not seen a distinguished point after 2 24 evaluations. In all, we have generated 33, 543, 077 chains (2 25 = 33, 554, 432, it misses the abandoned chains) and the number of groups containing at least two parallel chains is 4, 109, 961. Experimentally, the size of the giant component contains 3, 788, 059 users (among the 4, 194, 304) and so we can deduce the keys of 90% of the users. This result is what is expected from theory since the number of vertices in this experiment is below the number of nodes. The 98% that is previously given as result in section 3.5, would require twice as many vertices.
The time to generate the chains is 1600 sec using 4096 cores in parallel and the analysis of the graph requires a few minutes on a standard PC.
Attacks on the PRINCE cipher in the Multi-User and Classical Setting
PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher published at ASIACRYPT 2012 [8] . It is based on the F X construction [18] which is actually an Even-Mansour like construction. PRINCE has been the interest of many cryptanalysts [10, 25, 16] who attack either the full cipher, or its reduced version.
The designers of PRINCE claim that its security is ensured up to 2 127−n operations when an adversary acquires 2 n plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This bound has been reduced in [16] to 2 126 operations with a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. After a brief presentation of PRINCE, we describe a generic attack in the multi-user setting that allow to recover the key of a pair of users in a set of 2 32 users with complexity 2 64 computations. The identification of the pair of users uses the idea similar to the attack on Even-Mansour. However, details are different since PRINCE is not an Even-Mansour scheme as the internal permutation uses a secret key. Finally, we present another generic attack in the classical model that after a precomputation of 2 96 time and 2 64 in memory, allows to recover the key of every single user in time 2 32 . Both attacks work for all rounds of PRINCE.
Brief description of PRINCE
PRINCE [8] uses a 64-bit block and a 128-bit key which is split into two equal parts of 64 bits, i.e. k = k 0 k 1 . In order to extend the key to 192 bits it uses the mapping k = (k 0 k 1 ) → (k 0 k 0 k 1 ) where k 0 is derived from k 0 by using a linear function L :
where denotes the right shift and ≫ the rotation of a 64-bit word. While subkeys k 0 and k 0 are used as input and output whitening keys, the 64-bit key k 1 is used for the 12-round internal block cipher which is called PRINCE core . For simplicity, we refer to it as the core of PRINCE or simply the core function and we denote it by P core. So every plaintext P is transformed into the corresponding ciphertext C by using the function E k (P ) = k 0 ⊕ P core k1 (P ⊕ k 0 ) where P core uses the key k 1 (see Fig.1 ). The core function consists of a key k 1 addition, a round constant (RC 0 ) addition, five forward rounds, a middle round, five backward rounds and finally a round constant (RC 11 ) and a key k 1 addition. The full schedule of the core is shown in Fig. 2 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 1 6 11 The M layer, which is only used in the middle rounds, can be seen as a mirror in the middle of the core as the 5 backward rounds are defined as the inverse of the 5 forward rounds.
In every RC i -add step, a 64-bit round constant is XORed with the state. It should be noted that RC i ⊕ RC 11−i = α = 0xc0ac29b7c97c50dd for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 11. From this, but also from the fact that the matrix M is an involution, we can perform the decryption function of PRINCE by simply performing the encryption procedure with inverse order of keys k 0 and k 0 and by using the key k 1 ⊕ α instead of k 1 . That means, that for any key (k 0 k 0 k 1 ), we have D (k0 k 0 k1) (·) = E (k 0 k0 k1⊕α) (·). This property is called the α-reflection property of PRINCE.
Attack on PRINCE in the multi-user setting
In the multi-user setting, we assume that we have L different users which are all using the block cipher PRINCE. Each user U i with 0 ≤ i < L, chooses her key
1 at random and independently from all the other users. In order to attack PRINCE using the distinguished point method, we first construct a set of chains for every user using the function of PRINCE. For this, we use the function defined as follows:
where δ is an arbitrary but fixed non zero constant. The key k
vanishes from the equation and the function F thus takes the following form:
For every user U i , we create one encryption (E) chain and one decryption (D) chain which are both based on the function F defined above. E uses the encryption function of PRINCE whereas D uses the decryption function. And so, for the user U i , we define functions E and D as follows:
Let us define:
We create encryption chains until f E reaches a distinguished point (resp. decryption chains until f D reaches a distinguished point). We search for a collision between the encryption and the decryption chain.
Let us consider two users, U 1 and U 2 . Whenever the chains E k
1 ⊕α
arrive at the same distinguished point, we suspect that these two chains have become parallel. As the core of PRINCE is only parametrized by the key k 1 , when we arrive at the same distinguished point we obtain a probable collision between keys k
and k
1 ⊕ α used in P core. However, we must verify that this is a real collision and not just a random incident. For this, we verify that next points of f E and f D after reaching a distinguished point, continue to remain equal. If we obtained a real collision we know that:
This indicates that x
(1) ⊕ y (2) is expected equal to k
0 . It is obvious that since k
1 ⊕ α we will also have k
1 . This indicates that we also know k
0 . Thus, we have: k
Let {a 63 , . . . , a 0 } be the representation of the bits of k = {a 0 , a 63 , . . . , a 2 , a 1 ⊕ a 63 } and k
From ( * ), we construct the system:
As this is an inversible linear system, we can easily find k 
0 . Note that once k
has been found, recovering k
1 can be done with an exhaustive search whose cost is 2 64 .
Analysis of the attack. Once the computation of a chain is finished we have to store (x −1 , d, d+ 1) where d is the distinguished point, x −1 is the point before the chain reaches a distinguished point and d + 1 is the point after the chain reached a distinguished point. We need to store x −1 as we have to test if the found collision is useful and we also need to store d + 1 to test if it is a real collision. If not, the search must continue. As mentioned, PRINCE uses a 128-bit key which is split into two 64-bit parts, i.e. k = k 0 k 1 . The attack consists in identifying and recovering all key material of a pair of users i and j for whom k
1 ⊕ α between two different users with high probability when the number of users will be at least 2 32 . So the attack uses a set of 2 32 users and for each one we create 2 chains (encryption and decryption chain). The cost per user is 2 32 operations and the total cost for recovering the keys k 0 of 2 users is approximately 2 64 operations. For recovering k 1 , the cost of the exhaustive search is 2 64 . So in total, we can deduce both k 0 and k 1 in 2 65 operations.
Attack in the classical model
We show in this section that a classical attack that also uses the distinguished points technique can also be possible. For this, we will create encryption chains from the function E defined in section 4.2.
Precalculation. In the first phase of the attack, we aim to create encryption chains for every possible key k 32 . We store all chains S i .
Attack. Now, our purpose is to find a collision with one of the chains created with the zero key k
0 . For this, for a random starting point x 0 and for keys k 0 and k 1 we will calculate an encryption chain T from the function E. The chain T will collide with high probability with one of the chains S i . As described in previous section 4.2, when we detect a collision between two distinguished points, we know that the chains had become parallel and so we obtain k Analysis of the attack. For the precalculation phase, for every 2 64 possible keys we calculate a chain with length 2 32 and so our complexity is equal to 2 96 . As we need to store all chains, the precalculation phase has also a cost of 2 64 in memory. However, once the first phase is over, the attacker can perform the attack in only 2 32 operations as she has to calculate only one chain. So, the total cost of the attack is 2 96 . The proposed attack satisfies DT = 2 128 as D = 2 32 and T = 2 96 . This attack does not improve the complexity of PRINCE given in [8] and [16] . However, in our case, T is not the on-line time complexity as it corresponds to the precalculation phase of the attack. Thus, in our attack, we have DT on = 2 64 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented new tradeoffs for public-key and symmetric-key cryptosystems in the multi-user setting. We have introduced some algorithmic tools for collision-based attacks using the distinguished point technique. The first tool allows to look for the discrete logarithm of L users in parallel using only a O( √ L) penalty using random graph process behaviour. The second tool allows to achieve key-recovery of Even-Mansour and related ciphers and is a novel lambda technique to find collisions when two different functions are involved. For the EvenMansour cipher, we show new tradeoffs that partially solve an open problem due to Dunkelman et al. and we propose an analysis in the multi-user setting. Finally, for the PRINCE cipher, we show generic attacks that improve the best published results in the sense that our time complexity corresponds to a precomputation phase and not to an on-line phase. This last result could also be adapted to similar ciphers such as DESX and would also improve on the best previous attack.
A Probabilistic Results
A.1 Random Graph Process
In this subsection, we recall the results on random graph processes that can be found in [7] .
In the Erdős-Rényi graph model G{n, P r(edge) = p} (0 < p < 1), all graphs have vertex set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} in which edges are chosen independently and with probability p. In other words, if G 0 is a graph with vertex set V and it has m edges, then
where q = 1 − p and N = n 2 . A random graph process on V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a Markov chainG = (G t ) ∞ 0 , whose states are graphs on V . The process starts from the empty graph and for 1 ≤ t ≤ N the graph G t is obtained from G t−1 by adding an edge, all new edges begin equiprobable (we do not pick an edge that has been already chosen).
First of all, we give the result on the giant component Theorem 1. Let c > 1 be a constant, t = cn/2 and ω(n) → ∞. Then, almost every G t is the union of the giant component, the small unicyclic components and the small tree components. There are at most ω(n) vertices on the unicyclic components. The order of the giant component
and for every fixed i ≥ 2
where α = c − 1 − log c.
If t = O(n log n), then the graph is almost certainly connected.
Theorem 2. For t = 2n ln n , we have
We can find the expected value of t that makes the graph connected, and then apply tail bounds to compute the probability for this happening for a particular t in the random graph process. First notice that t ≥ n − 1 for a connected graph (a tree is a minimally-connected graph). As we add edges, we watch the number of connected components of the graph. Initially, the graph has n vertices and no edges, so there are n connected components. The first edge always connects two points, and gives us n − 1 connected components. The second edge also reduces the number of connected components to n − 2. The third may or may not reduce the number. We use epochs to model the different phases of the process (at each epoch, the number of connected components is the same). Let X k be the number of random edges added while there are k connected components, until there are k − 1 connected components. We have shown that X n = 1 and X n−1 = 1. If we define
then X counts the total number of edges that we add until the graph is connected. Our goal is to compute E(X). Now, define p k to be the probability that an edge added while there are k components reduces the number of components. We cannot compute p k exactly, but we can provide a lower bound. Assume that v is one edpoint of the edge we are adding. Then, there are at least k − 1 other vertices to which we can connect v and reduce the number of components (these other vertices lie on the other components). In total there are n − 1 other vertices to which we can connect v. So the probability that this edge reduces the number of components is ≥ (k − 1)/(n − 1). But this bound holds for any choice of v, so it also bounds p k :
Now, observe that X k is a geometric random variable with success probability p k . Its expected value is 1/p k ≤ (n − 1)/(k − 1). So we have
where H n−1 is the (n − 1) st harmonic number. In other words, an upper bound on E(X) is about n ln n.
The final step is to apply tail bounds on the probability of t being much larger than its mean using Chebyshev or Chernoff bounds.
Using Chernoff bound, we can show that for δ < 2e − 1
which in the special case of δ = 1 leads to Pr[X > 2n ln n] < n −n/4 .
A.2 Birthday Paradox with Girls and Boys
Theorem 3. Let two sequences of size n 1 (resp. n 2 ), uniformly chosen at random and independently in the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, then the expected number of collision is n 1 .n 2 /n.
B A survey of Existing Attacks on Even-Mansour
In this section, we recall previous attacks on the Even 
The memory complexity of this attack is min (T, D) . But, in practice we usually have D ≤ T since memory is a more scarce resource than time.
Biryukov-Wagner Slide attack. About ten years later, Biryukov and Wagner discovered the slide attack to break an arbitrarily number of rounds. Their technique can be adapted to the Even-Mansour cipher using a twist in the classical attack. Their attack has a complexity in D = N 1/2 known plaintexts and T = N 1/2 called to π. A slid pair is a pair of messages (P, P ) such that
Then, it is easy to see that we have the following condition for the slid pair:
The idea of the attack is that in a set of D = N 1/2 plaintexts, we can construct N pairs and there is at least one slid pair on average among them. Consequently, we can check the condition (1) by searching a collision between the values Π(P ) ⊕ π(P ). A collision between the pair (P i , P j ) will give us the two key candidates K 1 = P i ⊕ P j and K 2 = Π(P i ) ⊕ Π(P j ). The time complexity of this attack is T = N 1/2 and the memory requirement is M = N 1/2 .
Slidex attack on the Two-Key Even-Mansour. The attack for the two-key EM scheme is a generalization of the advanced sliding attack of [6] where Dunkelman et al. introduce an additional degree of freedom ∆ and is called the Slidex attack. In this attack, we assume that we have a slid pair which satisfies the property
for some ∆ ∈ {0, 1} n . For this plaintext pair, we have
and so the following slid pair condition is satisfied Π(P ) ⊕ π(P ⊕ ∆) = Π(P ) ⊕ π(P ⊕ ∆). times the EM scheme to get the known plaintext encryptions P i , Π(P i ). Then, for each of 2 n−d
arbitrary values for ∆ he stores the value i in a hash table indexed by Π(P i ) ⊕ π(P i ⊕ ∆) and searches for a slid pair in the hash table by checking the slid pair condition. Then each collision between (P i , P j ) with ∆ k will give key candidates K 1 = P i ⊕ P j ⊕ ∆ k and K 2 = Π(P i ) ⊕ π(P j ⊕ ∆ k ). This is a known-plaintext attack which works for any value D < N 1/2 . We will see later that one problem with this attack is that it is not possible to use precomputation.
C A reminder of distinguished points methods
Given a function f on a set S of size N , distinguished points methods allow to find collisions in a very flexible way. We first define a distinguished subset S 0 in S, using any efficiently testable property. The basic idea is, starting from a random point x 0 in S to construct chains of computations by evaluating the sequence x i+1 = f (x i ) until we encounter a distinguished point, i.e. an element of S 0 . The average length of such chains is = |S|/|S 0 |. Note that to avoid degenerate cases, it is useful to abort the computation of chains which do not reach a distinguished point after c 0 · steps, where c 0 > 1 is a fixed constant. Indeed, the proportion of points which satisfy the distinguishing property is 1/ . Then, the length of the chains is on average. If we compute chains of length c 0 · , then the proportion of chains that exceeds this value is (1 − 1/ ) c0 ≈ exp(−c 0 ). Values such as c 0 = 20 are often recommended [26] . Since the number of aborted chains is 20 times larger than the average, the proportion of aborted work is approximately 20e −20 < 5 · 10 −8 . Once the computation of a chain is finished, we store a summary of the chain (x 0 , x0 , d x0 ) containing the starting point x 0 , the number of iterations x0 and the distinguished endpoint d x0 . The most important property of chains is that two chains which pass through a common point necessarily end at the same distinguished point. The converse is almost true, two chains that end at the same distinguished point are merging at some point (and thus yield a collision) unless one of the two chains is a subchain of the other.
When building chains, an essential safety measure is to avoid computing many times the same thing. For example, it is useless to aim at computing chains of length larger than N 1/2 , because we expect such chains to cycle. Even if we make chains shorter, this can become a problem. Typically, when constructing B different chains of average length , we should always ensure that B · 2 do not grow beyond N [17] . Otherwise, we expect too many early mergings of the final chains into their predecessors. Collisions between 2-sets can be analyzed using Theorem 3 in Appendix.
D A reminder of Hellman's Time/Memory tradeoff
Hellman's algorithm is a method to invert a function f : S → S in time T = N 2/3 and memory M = N 2/3 with precomputation time P = N where N = |S|. The idea is to use m starting points and iterate f t times for each starting point to compute the ending points. We store the m starting and ending points in a hash table indexed by the ending points. A table represents a covering of mt points among the N values. If we try to invert a value y covered in the table, we iterate f from y until f (i) (y) is in the set of ending points. Now, from the corresponding starting point, we iterate f until we reach y and the previous value gives the preimage. The on-line time complexity is t if we test membership in the set of ending points using a hash table. The memory is reduced to m if we omit the log factors.
The matrix stopping rule is t · mt ≤ N since if we add a new line in the table, we will get a collision with one point of the m previous lines with probability t · (mt)/N according to Appendix A.2. Moreover, since colliding points will not add points to the coverage, a table cannot contain more than mt 2 ≤ N points. However, a table covers only mt points among the N values and then, from the matrix stopping rule, we cover at most a fraction 1/t of the N points. To increase this value, Hellman's idea is to use t independent tables with a related function f i . Now, the memory is mt and the on-line time complexity is mt since we need to iterate m different functions and test membership. If we fix t = m = N 1/3 , then we obtain the announced complexity and the precomputation needs to cover the whole space N .
